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Poverty and malnutrition consequences of structural adjustment: World Bank policy
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Something has gone awfully wrong with development. Poor people have been lured into urban areas with high expectations but little realization of a higher standard of living. They then are expected to pay a price for development from which they have derived little or no benefit. Their real wages, in contrast to their expected wages, have been hardly better than the real income they realized in their former rural settings. Yet it is proposed that their real wages should now be substantially reduced, especially by asking them to pay significantly higher prices for food. They are being turned back to their rural areas, where the ratio of land to people has often much deteriorated during this period of development. One needs to ask fundamental questions about the value of development that exacts such a high price from the poor and provides them with so little return.
It may be too early to tell whether the appropriate questions are being addressed and whether the right lessons will be learned. Practitioners and advisors are naturally still preoccupied with devising and analysing short-term curative measures for survival. Yet, sooner or later, a proper analysis of the recession and the adjustment policies should lead to a thorough reappraisal of fundamental propositions in development theory and practice. As for lessons, so far it is clear only that some schools of thought have been thoroughly discredited. Countries that have pursued "growth at any cost" or "equity at any cost" may have had spurts of success along the way, primarily backed by large injections of aid and loans, but the recession has vividly demonstrated that they were unable to sustain their efforts to eliminate poverty and malnutrition.
This recession and the pursuant adjustment policies provide unprecedented challenges, not only in determining what will not work in the elimination of abject poverty but also in answering the more difficult questions of what will work. Hypotheses about appropriate sets of policies that could effectively address the twin objectives of growth and poverty alleviation have yet to emerge. At this stage, all we can say is that policies aimed solely at efficient growth are also not enough. To the contrary, there is evidence from theory and practice that explicit attention to poverty must be an integral part of any solution.
Assessment of the Bank's position and its impact on countries must be based not only on what it says and does in conjunction with structural adjustment loans but also on its project-financing activity and its ongoing economic and sector studies in various countries. Any genuine concern for the alleviation of poverty and malnutrition suggests that adjustment policies advocated by anyone, including the World Bank, should be scrutinized in two dimensions. Do they contribute to the elimination of poverty over the long term, and do they alleviate or aggravate poverty and malnutrition in the present and the foreseeable future?
Most of my remarks are focused on the second question. Yet there are at least two reasons why we should not overlook the long-run implications of adjustment policies for poverty. First, many of the policy changes advocated are likely to eventually improve the welfare of the poor. Many of these policy changes are long overdue and there is no better time to implement them than now. Second, there are undoubtedly some policy adjustments that can make a positive difference for the poor in a relatively short time, and there are also others that will not. An evaluation of the short-term effects of policy adjustments obviously should influence our assessment of different adjustment policies, the extent to which a short-term negative impact might be tolerated, and the choice of measures for alleviating these consequences.
DEVELOPMENT POLICIES
As you know, the principal function of the World Bank is to assist countries to eliminate poverty. During the early years of the Bank's existence, the emphasis was almost entirely on stimulating capital transfers to the developing countries and ensuring the efficient use of their own as well as their borrowed resources for growth in the national product. The presumption was that this growth would be widely shared by the entire population. Then in Shlomo Reutlinger The World Bank, Washington, D.C., USA the late 1960s, a disenchantment set in with this ''trickledown" theory. Failure to reduce poverty significantly was attributed to excessive population growth and to lack of attention by investment programmes that would explicitly generate higher incomes among the poor by both governments and external assistance programmes.
In retrospect, one might question whether the diagnosis in the 1960s and 1970s was entirely correct. Some of the failures to eradicate poverty are attributable to inefficient public investments and excessive government interventions in markets. These are precisely the same policies the recession has shown to be in need of urgent adjustment. To the extent that the failure to eradicate poverty was the consequence of policies that all now recognize need to be reformed, in particular the policies discriminating against agricultural development, the adjustments occurring now in the 1 980s may turn out to be more beneficial than the partial reorientation of some investment projects carried out in the 1970s.
Effective policies to eliminate poverty need to continue to emphasize specific and explicit attention to the equity impact of investments and policies. The Bank is clearly achieving this emphasis through its selection of projects that will provide more remunerative employment to small farmers as well as its selection of projects in population, health, nutrition, and education. The Bank's policy advice on structural adjustment, however, has yet to pay enough explicit attention to the equity implications when ownership of physical and human resources are very unequally distributed, as is the case in many countries.
Turning now to the question of the World Bank's position on currently advocated structural adjustment policies and their effects on poverty and malnutrition in the immediate time horizon, my review of Bank documents leads me to conclude that a uniform, clear position has yet to emerge. At present, there are at least two positions. It is far too early to tell whether the older position on structural adjustment will be supplanted by the newer approach or whether both will coexist for a long time. In the meantime, it would be dangerous, I believe, to follow the natural and not uncommon instinct to "explain" any observed discrepancy between existing approaches as merely representing pragmatic adaptations of one single, coherent policy.
Early Structural Adjustment Policy
The first position, which dates from the Bank's beginnings, is that growth is essential for solving many problems, including poverty and malnutrition. Therefore, although structural adjustment policies do not directly address issues of human resource development and basic needs, they will eventually enable countries to do better on that score as well. The only criterion for selecting adjustment policies ought to be whether they will enable the country to attract more capital and use its resources effectively toward the growth objective. From the very beginning, attention has been drawn by the Bank to the fact that in the short-run the poor may get hurt, although it is often said there is yet no conclusive evidence. The Bank's response under this policy stance has been that countries that implement all the recommended savings can afford to set up special income-transfer programmes for the very poor. Unfortunately, the administrative and political difficulties for setting up such programmes have usually not been investigated, and much less have such programmes been designed and implemented.
Recent Structural Adjustment Policy
The second and more recent policy stance is enunciated in the World Bank's policy study Poverty and Hunger: Issues and Options for Food Security in Developing Countries. This report strongly endorses growth as the ultimate solution and by implication many of the policy changes advocated under structural adjustment. But the report also indicates that, under the best of circumstances and policies, it will take a long time before growth will cure poverty, in particular where the initial distribution of assets is very unequal. Therefore, governments need to intervene actively to ensure adequate food consumption by all through cost-effective and administratively and politically feasible methods.
The new approach recommended in this recent policy statement has far-reaching implications for the Bank's involvement in structural and adjustment operations. The policy statement implies, for instance, caution before recommending that food prices should be raised. The damage to the poor needs to be assessed, and then it must be determined whether special food or income-distribution programmes are politically or administratively feasible. Only if it has been established that the poor can be reached more cost-effectively through targeted programmes than by maintaining lower food prices should it be recommended that food price subsidies should eliminated. In some circumstances, where there are many poor people and they are difficult to reach, it may be more cost-effective to subsidize the food in the market for everyone and to target new taxes for those who can afford to pay for the subsidized food.
A proper cost-effectiveness analysis almost certainly challenges the often-stated recommendation that countries should let their food prices fluctuate with the world market price and compensate poor farmers or consumers where appropriate with targeted income or food transfer programmes. It is quite unrealistic to think that it is feasible to set up temporary distribution programmes on short notice at any reasonable cost.
In parallel with the preparation of the Bank's study on food-security policy, there are currently in preparation a number of structural adjustment operations that are beginning to incorporate the second position I have just briefly described. The following are some illustrations of this position.
Grain Marketing Reform Programme in Mali, 1980
Perhaps the first structural adjustment operation in which the Bank recognized the need to go slowly in raising food prices for consumers while promoting higher prices for producers, was in the case of the Grain Marketing Reform Programme in Mali in March 1980. The structural adjustment reforms were to be linked with a multi-year commitment of food-aid shipments to be sold by the government at official prices. These prices were to be raised gradually. The proceeds from the sale of the food aid were to go into a special fund to compensate the government for its losses from selling to consumers below the cost of purchasing the grain.
The reforms did not materialize as originally planned, but the attempts made in this case should be lauded for having established a ground-breaking precedent in donor collaboration and particularly for introducing the use of food aid in support of structural reforms. Another feature, also common to subsequent, similar efforts, is worth noting. The main beneficiaries were to be middleincome, salaried urban workers. The primary motivation for compensating potential losers was to remove political obstacles to the implementation of structural reforms, and another objective was to forestall demands for higher wages. Apparently, there was not much effort made to limit the programme to low-priced food or to target the efforts to the poorest groups.
Proposed Agricultural Incentive Programme for Guinea-Bissau, 1986
An Agricultural Incentives Programme Credit is proposed for Guinea-Bissau by the World Bank this year. The loan comes under the category of what the Bank calls sectoral adjustment lending. Essentially, its aims are the same as those of the Mali grain-policy programme-to support the revamping of agricultural policies in order to increase food and export-crop production. Predictably, this means raising official producer prices-and consumer food prices too -while promoting market liberalization and reducing foreign-exchange deficits. Also like the Mali programme, this set of policy reforms will be linked to a plan providing a buffer for those adversely affected by a rise in consumer food prices. It would also be based on a fund constituted from the sale of food-aid donations, and it would be co-ordinated by the World Food Programme.
In this plan, however, proceeds from government food-aid sales would go towards raising wages of lowincome urban groups commensurate with the real income drop experienced because of higher rice prices. There is also a provision to monitor the effects of higher food prices on both production and urban and rural consumption.
Analysis of the expected income effects on the rural population by region revealed that, in most cases, farmers would not suffer net income losses from higher food prices because of compensating higher producer prices. Only one zone is projected to lose under the new price structure. The Bank recommends that compensatory policies be targeted there also.
Use of Food Aid Fund to Support Proposed Structural Adjustment in Mauritania, 1986
In a proposed structural adjustment credit, the World Bank will support the continuing efforts of the government of Mauritania to keep public spending down, to decontrol prices to provide incentives to producers, and to adopt a flexible exchange rate. Some of these measures lead to increases in consumer food prices that are agreed to be necessary at this time.
Mauritania is heavily dependent on food aid and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future. It is particularly noteworthy that donor and food-aid co-ordination issues are being given high priority in this credit.
Along with the World Food Programme, the Bank would be helping the government to set up a common fund into which would go the counterpart funds from food-aid sales. As in the Mali and Guinea-Bissau plans, this fund would be organized by the country's donors. It would be used to improve food availability and nutrition and to promote income-generating activities. Guidelines agreed on by both government and donors will provide criteria for limiting free food-aid distribution to the truly needy. Currently, free food aid makes up 60 per cent of the food-aid supply. This percentage will remain high in order to offset the negative impact of higher prices on the poor. Half the proceeds of food-aid sales now go for these distribution costs and for maintenance of food security stocks. With the institution of the common fund, the remainder could be mobilized for investments that, in general, enhance food security -mainly those with a medium-term impact.
In the past Mauritania has very successfully managed food-aid distribution in the rural areas and avoided a strong urban bias, even to the extent of setting retail prices in the outlying districts substantially below city prices. At the same time, the increased needs of low-income people will be addressed by this programme as well.
Proposed Compensatory Programme for Reducing Food Subsidies in Morocco, 1986
The government of Morocco has agreed to eliminate consumer food subsidies by 1990 as part of a programme of structural adjustment as 11 per cent of government expenditures are devoted to food subsidies. This measure, though politically drastic, has been deemed necessary to reduce Morocco's budget deficit, to reduce foreign-exchange outlays on growing food imports, and to redirect agricultural incentives to the food crops in which the country's comparative advantage lies. Analysis by the Bank and the IMP has shown that the increase in consumer food prices resulting from the withdrawal of subsidies would cause serious reductions in the real income of urban and urban fringe low-income groups as well as some of the poorest rural population.
A recent report prepared by the Bank proposed a number of programmes to offset the effects of eliminating consumer food subsidies, which are likely to have negative repercussions on overall welfare, nutrition, and political stability. Basically, it is proposed to target direct transfers of food through existing social centres and work projects and to initiate supply-side policies aimed at containing the increase in food prices by reducing production and marketing costs.
Several features not encountered in the previous cases are worth highlighting. The population needing compensatory programmes is quite large -on the order of 2 million people in urban areas. Although it is possible to build on experience with existing programmes in Morocco, the proposed administrative task is formidable, and there are no clear proposals for administering the proposed massive rural work programme. However, it is estimated that even inadequate coverage and compensation to the poorest will cost around 10 per cent of the expected savings from existing subsidies. The prospects of an effective programme would be greatly enhanced if food aid could be counted on to co-finance this approach in Morocco as well as in other countries. Yet, for whatever reasons, food-aid agencies are expected to phase out food aid.
CONCLUSION
Because the problems of poverty and nutrition are worsening, pursuing better policies in the 1980s than in the 1 970s is obviously not enough. We have yet to evolve a set of policies that would effectively address the twin objectives of growth and poverty-alleviation in the short term as well as over the long term. While we know that "growth at any cost" and "distribution at any cost" may provide temporary comfort but will fail to produce lasting benefits and can precipitate sharp reversals, the propensity for proposing simplistic solutions unfortunately does not diminish in times of crisis. One such solution in current vogue is that "efficient growth" will work. There is little basis in theory or in practice to suppose that even efficient growth will eliminate poverty at any time in the foreseeable future and certainly not in the immediate future. Hence, some special attention to alleviating the worst aspects of poverty will also be required.
I believe that the SCN can play an important role in the evolution of such a set of policies if it underscores the following principles and pursues the following actions: -It should not only draw attention to the magnitude of the problem but provide development agencies with assistance (data, research) that will help them develop cost-effective solutions. It should resist any suggestion that poverty and nutrition problems are always best addressed in the context of specific relief measures. It should play a more active role in promoting the use of food aid in the context of promoting development with the twin objectives of growth and poverty-alleviation.
